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THE CABLE ACT
OF 1992
INTRODUCTION
The fight over the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 19921 (hereinafter
"The Cable Act") pitted consumer groups and the
broadcast networks against the enormous American
cable television industry, resulting in a multi-million
dollar lobbying and advertising campaign. Even the
fabled Hollywood "cultural elite" weighed in on the
debate, ironically backing its usual nemesis in the
Bush White House.
This update will briefly discuss the political
debate over the issue, and will analyze the more
notable sections of this comprehensive consumer-ori-
ented law. It will focus particularly on those elements
of the legislation that have drawn the most attention
from its opponents. The discussion will then turn to
several features that are less controversial, but which
will be most noticed by the average consumer. This
update will conclude that, while the Act was touted
by Congress and consumer groups as an immediate
tonic for cable consumer concerns, the Act may actu-
ally result in higher rates, at least in the short term.
BACKGROUND
In 1984, Congress deregulated most of the
American cable television industry in order to mini-
mize the economic burdens of regulation and to "pro-
vide the widest possible diversity of information" to
the cable consumer.' Indeed, the removal of that eco-
nomic burden did result in capital improvements
within the industry and expansion in the amount of
available cable programming. For example, while the
typical cable system in 1984 consisted of just 24 or
fewer channels per subscriber, a typical system just
six years later carried between 30 and 53 channels.3
Similarly, expenditures for programming by cable net-
works grew almost threefold between 1984 and 1989.1
Today, 60 percent of households with television, or
56 million customers overall, subscribe to cable TV,
and the industry has grown a whopping 800 percent
in overall sales between 1980 and 1992.'
Seemingly, the goals of the 1984 Act were met, if
not surpassed. But all that growth did not occur with-
out consequences. While the industry boomed, so did
its customers' bills-by 61 percent from 1986 to 1992.6
That was almost three times the rate of inflation for
the same period.7 The industry has been maligned not
just for excessive rates, but also for inadequate cus-
tomer service and technical quality. The Cable Act
addresses each of these concerns.
In 1990, calls for renewed regulation arose in
both houses of Congress.8 Those in favor charged the
1984 Act had failed to produce a competitive atmos-
26 Journal of Art & Entertainment Law 1
Packowitz: The Cable Act of 1992
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
phere for the industry. In fact, 97 percent of all dereg-
ulated markets presently have only one provider of
cable TV.' The Senate first passed its version of The
Cable Act in January 1992.10 In July the House passed
its own version." A compromise bill passed the
House 280 to 128, and the Senate by a vote of 74 to
25. After a presidential veto, both houses mounted a
successful override effort, the first and only one dur-
ing President Bush's tenure. The 74-to-25 margin in
the Senate and 308-to-114 margin in the House
included both Democrats and Republicans. Still, in the
words of Senate Minority leader Robert Dole (R-Kan.),
the Democrats' strong push for the bill was nothing
more than "an effort to embarrass the President 30
days before the election." "
Support for the legislation was two-pronged. First,
consumer groups such as the Consumer Federation of
America backed the law for its hoped-for impact on
skyrocketing cable rates.'5 The major television broad-
cast networks also supported the bill because they
stood to gain from any attempt to reign in their chief
competitors in the cable industry.14 On the opposite
side, the cable industry argued reregulation would
actually raise rates, primarily due to a measure in the
Act that allows local broadcast stations to charge local
cable operators for retransmitting their programming."
Also, the industry feared additional costs arising from
the law's numerous requirements for revamped tech-
nical equipment." Film executives worried they
would lose out on their royalty payments from the
cable industry, as the cable industry would have less
capital to spend purchasing programming from
Hollywood. 7
The advertising campaigns for both sides in this
high-stakes debate took on more the flavor of a
national election campaign than of a typical lobbying
effort. Nationally-reported press conferences by both
sides occurred on an almost daily basis as the votes in
each house of Congress approached. The Sunday
morning network talk shows took up the issue in
depth." One cable outlet did not give up the fight
even after enactment of the Act. Multimedia
Cablevision of Wichita, Kansas, began running tele-
vised editorials ripping into Representative Dan
Glickman (D-Kan.) just before the election, presum-
ably to exact revenge for Glickman's vote in favor of
reregulation.19
Interwoven within the debate was the age-old
philosophical argument of regulation versus nonregu-
lation, of more government versus less government. It
was in this context that cable regulation became such
a divisive issue, during a presidential campaign in
which the incumbent tried to define the differences
between himself and his opponent in exactly that
way.
THE LEGISLATION AND ITS IMPACT
The Cable Act is a comprehensive law that
addresses virtually every complaint a cable customer
could make. For example, the Act includes provisions
regarding such far-reaching subjects as avoiding the
clutter of remote controls on customers' coffee tables
to the number of customer service telephone lines a
cable operator must have. In fact, the law is so
detailed it leaves itself open to charges of governmen-
tal micromanagement?'
This section will first deal with those elements of
the Act that have drawn the most attention, namely:
(1) a provision that reinstitutes rate regulation, (2)
another that allows local broadcast stations to charge
cable systems for retransmitting their programming,
and (3) a measure that mandates the stations that
must be carried by cable systems.2
A. A Renewed Regime
of Rate Regulation
The centerpiece of the Act is its scheme of rate
regulation.' As discussed above, average cable rates
have far outpaced the rate of inflation since deregula-
tion in 1984. Rate regulation under the Act applies to
many facets of a cable system's operations, including
charges for basic programming, premium program-
ming, equipment and service calls?'
1. Preference for Competition
As a prerequisite for any rate regulation, the Act
requires that a given cable company's market not be
subject to "effective competition."' The Act defines a
market subject to "effective competition" as having
three main characteristics:" (1) fewer than 30 percent
of households in the market are cable subscribers; (2)
there are at least two unaffiliated cable operators in
the market, both of which are available to at least
one-half of the market's households; and (3) cable
operators other than the largest market operator have
at least a 15 percent combined share of the total num-
ber of subscribers.' If those conditions are not met, a
cable operator is then subject to rate regulation.
This definition of "effective competition" takes
into account not just the number of cable systems in a
given market, but also the scope of those cable sys-
tems. Especially through factor (1) above, Congress
has acted not just to promote competition between
cable systems, but to protect the market share of the
broadcast stations that serve a cable operator's mar-
ket. However, the tripartite definition is so restrictive
that only approximately five percent of the nation's
cable markets meet it.27
2. Guidelines for Setting Rates
The Cable Act requires that rates be "reason-
able."128 It mandates the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to create guidelines for determin-
ing exactly what "reasonable rates" are.? In promul-
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gating these guidelines, the FCC is to take into
account a number of factors. Most notably, the
Commission will look at the few cable systems that
operate in competitive markets in setting a standard
for reasonable rates.- The FCC will also look at the
various operating costs for a given cable system, tak-
ing into account an operator's need for a reasonable
profit.-' Because there are a number of such factors to
be taken into account by the FCC in setting guide-
lines, the Act permits a significant amount of flexibili-
ty in its rate regulation structure.
3. Who Determines Rates
for a Given Franchise?
The Act orders the FCC to set guidelines, rather
than enacting exact dollar figures, for a given system's
rates. Under the Act, local municipalities that fran-
chise their cable systems will set rates and administer
them, based on the FCC guidelines z By allowing
local franchising authorities to set rates, the Act par-
tially deflects the charge of government microman-
agement. However, the FCC is empowered to disap-
prove of the franchising authority's rate determination
if it finds that determination is not in compliance with
the Cable Act."
Surprisingly, the cable industry did not direct
most of its energy against these rate restrictions, but
instead focused on other parts of the Act it said
would result in higher customer rates. It was impossi-
ble for the industry to argue rate regulation alone
would cost consumers through increased rates,
because the regulating authority need only order
them lower. Rather, the industry attacked a measure
that drastically alters its relationship with the broad-
casters whose signals cable systems carry.
B. Royalty Payments to Local
Broadcasters
The cable industry focused on a provision in the
Act that affects arrangements between local cable
operators and the local stations that broadcast in their
markets.4 Prior to passage of the Act, local cable
operators were able to retransmit the signals of local
stations without making royalty payments to those
stations.35 The Act now gives local stations the right to
charge royalties for retransmission of their signals."6
The cable industry claimed that this provision would
exact a toll of increased rates to customers-the
opposite of the Cable Act's stated intent.37
The provision may very well result in higher rates
in the short term, even with the new scheme of rate
regulation. Clearly, the measure will increase local
operators' expenses if local stations demand royalties
from them. While rates would be regulated to help
protect the consumer from having this expense
passed on, "reasonable rates" are to be set in part by
looking at a cable operator's expenses.5' Thus, if costs
increase, a cable operator will be entitled to recoup
those losses through a rate increase.
But there is more to this issue than meets the eye.
Congress, anticipating the criticism, defended this
requirement within the Act itself: "Cable systems ...
obtain great benefits from local broadcast signals
which, until now, they have been able to obtain with-
out consent... [tihis has resulted in an effective subsidy
for cable systems by local broadcasters." ' By imple-
menting the royalty provision, Congress has sought to,
correct an inequity in the broadcasting industry. Just
as the Cable Act's definition of "competition" was
molded to protect non-cable broadcast stations,
Congress again seems to be protecting broadcast net-
works and their affiliates by addressing the television
industry's internal structure. It thus becomes clear that
the Cable Act was not drafted solely for the immediate
benefit of consumers, as its advocates have claimed.
In the short term, at least, the measure actually
seems to defeat what its proponents claimed was the
purpose of the Act. The Consumer Federation of
America, for instance, did not support the Cable Act
because it would promote equity within the industry,
but because it would improve fairness to those outside
the industry. That is undoubtedly why its sponsors
entitled the Act The Cable Consumer Protection Act
and Competition Act"-to attract consumer support.
Clearly there is more to the Act than its consumer-
oriented measures. The royalty provision is targeted at
the structural inequities of the cable industry, espe-
cially as they effect broadcasters. The royalty provi-
sion seems incompatible with the immediate interests
of consumers, only because it may lead to higher
rates in the short term. But if it corrects the structural
flaws embedded within the television industry, the
result may be more effective competition, and thus a
more efficient market-based television industry in the
long run.
Still, support for the Act from Congress's con-
sumer constituencies was garnered by convincing
them that the Act would be a tonic for customer com-
plaints. The royalty provision is, at least in the imme-
diate future, incompatible with that goal.
C. Must-Carry Requirements
Another substantive feature of the Act is its "must-
carry" provisions-requirements that local cable oper-
ators carry certain stations and programming. 40 The
Act lays down a complex set of rules for what stations
must be carried by a local cable system, based on the
system's channel capacity.41 In short, stations are
required to carry most if not all the broadcast stations
in their market areas. The requirement implicates the
First Amendment because, in a sense, it compels
"speech" by a cable operator.42 Already, a number of
suits have been filed attacking this provision of the
Act on First Amendment grounds.45
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D. Assorted "Consumer-Friendly"
Measures
The Act contains an array of measures that are
meant to address the various complaints cable con-
sumers have voiced since deregulation. Each, howev-
er, creates additional costs for cable operators, and
may result in higher rates, even under regulation.
1. "Anti-Buy Through" Provision
Before the Act, cable operators were entitled to
require subscribers to purchase a level of program-
ming beyond a basic tier in order to receive premium
services (such as popular channels HBO and
Showtime). The Act now allows customers who only
subscribe to basic services to purchase premium
channels "a la carte." " In other words, customers are
not required to "buy through" a more expensive tier
of programming in order to obtain premium stations.
Cable operators argue this requirement will force
many of them to provide expensive new equipment
to subscribers.4 This, they claim, will raise operating
expenses, and thus consumers' rates. The claim is off-
set by the fact that subscribers will specifically save
money from the provision itself. In response to the
industry's complaints, the Act provides a waiver if this
proposition creates "unreasonable" expenses for a
cable company, but does not define the term "unrea-
sonable.""
2. Customer Service Requirements
Many cable customers know the frustration of
waiting for the "cable guy"-the service representa-
tive-to install or alter cable service. Typically, a
cable company will give a range of several hours that
the representative may arrive. A customer is thus
required to set aside a large portion of a day waiting
for his or her arrival. Similarly, a common complaint
is that cable service customer service agents are not
sufficiently accessible by telephone. The Act address-
es both of these concerns by allowing local franchis-
ing authorities to set customer service standards for
their cable systems.17
3. Compatibility of Equipment
The Act also recognizes the frustration viewers
experience when their remote controls and video cas-
sette recorders are not compatible with equipment
supplied by a cable company. 8 For instance, some
cable systems do not permit a VCR to tape two differ-
ent stations in one night without a viewer returning to
reset the cable box. This defeats the VCR's capacity to
tape many different programs while its owner is
away. Not only does this annoy customers, but it also
creates a disincentive for customers to purchase those
machines-an economically unsound situation.49
Under the Act, the FCC may create guidelines
under which cable systems will be required to recon-
figure their equipment to prevent this incompatibility.
The FCC may also promulgate rules under which
cable systems must be compatible with commercially
available remote controls. This will allow customers
to use one "universal" remote to control a VCR, a tele-
vision and a cable converter box. This will cut down
on he "remote control clutter" prevalent in many
households.
4. Negative Option
Billing Prohibited
Cable customers nationwide were outraged in the
summer of 1991 when TCI Cable of Denver intro-
duced a premium channel called "Encore" with what
is known as "negative option" billing." Customers
were required to call their cable company to refuse
the service and avoid billing. Usually a premium ser-
vice requires a subscriber to place an affirmative
order. The Act now prohibits such billing schemes."
E. The Legislation's Impact
The Act is too detailed to list each of its measures.
But the above should give an idea of the extent to
which Congress has moved to reregulate a cable tele-
vision industry that it believes has attained something
close to a monopoly status since 1984.
On its face, the Cable Act is a consumer-oriented
law. That is how it was promoted by its backers in
exchange for the support of much of the nation.
There is, of course, a reason it is called the "Cable
Consumer Protection and Competition Act," and not
the "Cable Competition and Consumer Protection
Act." As a result, there are a great many provisions in
the Act that attack specific customer complaints with
the cable industry, and consumers will almost certain-
ly notice and appreciate those elements of the statute.
Is the Cable Act really a consumer law, though?
Certainly that is what most members of the Congress
who voted for it will be telling their constituents back
home. Meanwhile, the cable industry will undoubted-
ly continue to complain that the Cable Act will harm
those same consumer constituents. Who is right?
Ironically, it appears both sides are.
The cable industry is probably correct that the
Cable Act's royalty payment provision will increase its
costs, which will in turn be passed on to cable sub-
scribers. That would appear to counteract the con-
sumer-oriented goals of the statute. But in the end,
perhaps, that will not be the case. The average cable
consumer may not notice the structural flaws within
the cable industry, but is effected by them nonethe-
less. A measure that addresses those flaws benefits
consumers in the long term if it results in a more
competitive industry in years to come, even if short-
term costs and rates increase. The Cable Act's royalty
provision may be just that sort of measure.
The problem, then, is not that the royalty provi-
sion contradicts the consumer-based measures of the
Act, but that it does not address consumer needs with
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the same immediacy as the rest of the statute. That in
itself is not a problem, but for the fact that the bill was
not promoted for its long-range curative measures.
The Cable Act was generally supported for its
immediate remedies to specific consumer complaints.
The mistake of the Act's drafters was not necessarily
in including the royalty provision, but in promoting
the Act as a short-term tonic. The American consumer
believed it was getting immediate relief, when in real-
ity the Act is equally aimed at long range correction.
Those two interests are not necessarily compatible in
the short term. As a result, consumers who expect rate
relief the day after the Cable Act goes into effect may
be sorely disappointed. Ten years from now, they may
understand why. However, the Act was not supported
by consumers for its effects ten years from now.
CONCLUSION
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 is a comprehensive law that
attacks many of the consumer ills and high rates that
have developed from eight years of industry deregula-
tion. But while touted as an immediate cure-all to all
kinds of consumer complaints, the Act also addresses
long-term structural flaws of the television market.
Those long range aims compromise the Act's short-
term goal of rate relief. As a result, consumers who
thought the Act would provide immediate rate relief
will likely find their short-term needs usurped by the
statute's significant modification of the cable industry.
Ron Packowitz
1. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1960 (1992)
[hereinafter Cable Act]. Enacted October 5, 1992. Effective
December 4, 1992.
2. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C.
5521(1)(6) (1992).
3. H.R. Rep. No. 682, 101st Cong., Sess. 29 (1990). Today
systems with 75 channels are common. Residents in Queens, New
York enjoy 150 channels. Edmund L Andrews, Cable Bill approved
by Senate, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 23, 1992, at D1.
4. H.R. No. 682, supra note 3, at 29.
5. Andrews, supra note 3.
6. Elaine S. Povich, Fierce Fight as Industry Tries to Zap
Cable TVBiI1, Cin. TRmUNE, Sept. 17, 1992, S 1 at 1, 18.
7. Dennis Camire, House Panel Sets Stage for Cable TV
Debate, GAmrErr NEws SERvIcE, July 22, 1992.
8. House Report, supra note 3, at D2.
9. 138 CONG. Rac. H8321 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1992) (H.R.
Conference Report).
10. S.12, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 31, 1992. Search of
LEXIS, LEGIS library, Bill Tracking file (Dec. 14, 1992).
11. H.R. 4850, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess., July 23, 1992. Search
of LEXIS, LEGIS library, Bill Tracking file (Dec. 14, 1992).
12. Dennis Camire, Congress Hands Bush Defeat on Cable
TVBiI4 CHI. SuN-TimEs, Oct. 6, 1992, at 3.
13. Andrews, supra note 3, at D1.
14. Edmund L. Andrews, A Mixed Signal for Consumers;
Cable TV Bill Provides Only Limited Regulation of Rates, N.Y. TiMEs,
Oct. 6, 1992, at Al8.
14. Cable Act, supra note 1, at S 6.
15. CONG. REc. H8321, supra note 9.
16. Edmund L. Andrews, Cable Bill Approved by Senate,
N.Y. Tu .s, Sept. 22, 1992, at D1.
17. "This Week with David Brinkley" (ALBC television broad-
cast, Oct. 11, 1992).
18. Craig Winneker, Cable Firm Launches Air War on
Glickmar RoLL CA., Oct. 15, 1992.
19. 138 CONG. REc. H6501 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (state-
ment of Rep. Schaefer).
20. A number of the Act's measures are beyond the scope
of this article. Most notable of these is a provision that creates new
restrictions on cross-ownership of cable systems and other struc-
tures within the communications industry. See Cable Act, supra
note 1, at S 11(a).
21. Cable Act, supra note 1, at S 3(a).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Recent Federal Communications Commission measures
are attempting to increase competition to the cable industry
through other means of video delivery. For example, on July 19,
1992, the FCC issued a recommendation promoting what is known
as "video dialtone." This would allow telephone companies to
transmit video through phone lines. Ideally, the system would com-
pete directly with cable television. Action in Docket Case, Local
Telephone Companies to be allowed to Offer Video Dialtone Services,
1992 FCC Lexis 4055. Other attempts to increase competition are
found in the Act itself. It requires premium services such as HBO,
Showtime or pay-per-view services to make their programming
available to alternative television sources, such as video dialtone. It
also prohibits cities from granting exclusive franchises to individual
cable operators. Cable Act, supra note 1, at S 3(a).
Conservative columnist George Will convincingly advances
the argument that the entertainment industry as a whole should be
the relevant market for determining whether a given cable system
is subject to effective competition. "You don't have to watch cable
television," Will says. "Open a book, go to the movies." By this
standard, of course, all cable systems are subject to effective com-
petition, and none should be regulated. "This Week With David
Brinkley," supra note 17.
26. News Conference with Rep. Pete Geren (D-DO and Rep.
John Bryant (D-T), FED. NEws SERvIcE, October 5, 1992. This is the
predominant difference between the 1992 Act and the 1984
Communications Policy Act. The 1984 Act also provided for rate
regulation of cable companies not subject to "effective competi-
tion." However, it defined a market as "competitive" if at least three
local broadcast stations were available. That liberal definition
exempted 97 percent of cable operators from rate regulation. This
is the exact opposite of the 1992 Act, which exempts only three
percent of cable operators. Michael Botein, Cable Regulation Bilk
Boon to Broadcasters or Vewers?, N.Y..J., Sept. 23, 1992, at 1.
27. Cable Act, supra note 1, at S 3(a).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Cable Act, supra note 1, at S 6. Undoubtedly, cable
operators found it safer to attack this proposition because the
issues surrounding it were far more complex than those involving
rate regulation. As noted above, it would have been difficult to
convince consumers that rate regulation in itself would be harmful.
The industry undoubtedly calculated that public opinion (and thus
Congressional opinion) would be more susceptible to arguments
involving issues esoteric to the industry.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The "synopsis" of the Act states that its purpose is "to
provide increased customer protection" in the cable television mar-
ket. Cable Act, supra note 1.
37. Cable Act, supra note 1, at S 3(a).
38. Id. at S 3(a).
39. Id. at S 4.
30 Journal of Art & Entertainment Law 5
Packowitz: The Cable Act of 1992
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
40. Id.
41. U.S. Const. amend I; United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (affirming constitutionality of FCC juris-
diction over cable television).
42. 2d Suit Filed on Cable Law, N.Y TimES, Oct. 16, 1992, at
D9.
43. Cable Act, supra note 1; Bureau of National Affairs,
House Committee Action on Cable Bill Unlikely Until June, WASH.
INSIDER, May 11, 1992.
44. To achieve the Act's anti-buy through measure, every
subscriber must have an individually addressable converter box.
This is the *cable box" found beside many customers' television
sets. Some systems do not currently use these devices. Andrews,
supra note 3, at D2.
45. Cable Act, supra note 1, S 3(a).
46. Id. at S 8.
47. Id. atS 17.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Andrew Fegelman, Cable firm drops automatic movie
charge, Cm. TRm., June 15, 1991, 51 at 1.
51. Cable Act, supra note 1, at S 3(a).
Fall, 1992 31 6
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol3/iss1/5
